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INTRODUCTION

I am deeply grateful to the editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review
for putting together this symposium on my book, The Case Against the
Supreme Court, and to the authors who have written such terrific
articles about it. It is incredibly flattering, and humbling, to have
Professors Neal Devins, Brian Fitzpatrick, Barry Friedman, Corinna
Lain, Gerald Rosenberg, and Ed Rubin take my book seriously and
write such thoughtful papers in response. I cannot possibly thank
them enough. The hope of any author is to be read and taken
seriously, and hopefully to be part of a conversation on important
issues. These authors have fulfilled my greatest hope in writing the
book.

*
Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, Raymond Pryke Professor of First
Amendment Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
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As I read their papers, I found myself nodding in agreement at
their points. Not once did I feel that any of the authors made an unfair
criticism. But there, of course, are areas of disagreement among us.
In this short essay, I want to identify these areas of contention. For
some of the points, I have thoughts to offer that continue the dialogue.
The central question of my book is how should we assess the
Supreme Court's performance over the course of American history?
My conclusion is that the Supreme Court often has failed at its most
important tasks and at the most important times. I set out this thesis
at the beginning the book:
To be clear, I am not saying that the Supreme Court has failed at these crucial tasks
every time. Making a case against the Supreme Court does not require taking such an
extreme position. I also will talk about areas where the Court has succeeded in
protecting minorities and in enforcing the limits of the Constitution. My claim is that
the Court has often failed where and when it has been most needed. That is the case
against the Supreme Court that this book presents.1

I believe that recognizing this is important in order to focus on how to
improve the institution and make it much more likely to succeed in
the future. In Chapter 9 of the book, I offer a number of proposals for
2
changing the Court and how it operates.
Most of all, I wrote the book to be part of a conversation of how
our society thinks and talks about the Supreme Court. I intentionally
chose to write it for a trade press-VIKING--and hopefully in a way
that is accessible to a large audience. There remains a stunning
formalism in how people discuss the Supreme Court. In this
presidential election year, every Republican candidate has embraced
originalism and a view of judicial review that seemingly allows the
justices to decide constitutional cases without regard to their own
values and ideology. It is reflected in John Roberts's statement to the
Senate Judiciary Committee at his hearing that justices are just
"umpires." 3
This notion of value free judging, essentially of formalism, is
understandably appealing, but impossible. Unlike umpires, Supreme
Court justices make the rules. Unlike umpires, Supreme Court
justices constantly must make value choices. Some of it is because the
Constitution is written in broad, open-ended language. What is "cruel
and unusual punishment" or what does "equal protection" require?
1.
ERwiN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 11 (2014).
2.
Id. at 293-330.
3.
ConfirmationHearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States: HearingBefore S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts).
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What is an "unreasonable" search or arrest within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment?
Moreover, balancing is inherently a part of constitutional law.
For example, all equal protection and substantive due process claims
require a balancing of the government's interests and the right to be
free from discrimination (when it is an equal protection claim) and the
claimed liberty or property interest (when it is a substantive due
process claim). The levels of scrutiny are simply rules for how the
weights are placed on the scales for balancing. If it is strict scrutiny,
then the weights are very much on the side of the challenger and
against the government. If it is rational basis review, it is the reverse
with the weights very much on the side of the government and against
the challenger. With intermediate scrutiny, the weights on the scale
are more evenly arranged, but generally more on the side of the
challenger and against the government; for example, it is the
government that has the burden of proof under intermediate
4
scrutiny.
There is no way to balance apart from the values and ideology
of the justices. For instance, in the context of affirmative action, the
crucial question is whether diversity in colleges and universities is a
compelling government interest. 5 No method of interpretationoriginalism or any other---can avoid the need for justices to make a
value choice.
Thus, the underlying point of my book, made explicit in the
concluding chapter, is that we need to hold the justices accountable for
their choices, because they are exactly that: value choices about who
and what to favor and disfavor. In my conclusion, I write:
Let's admit that this emperor has no clothes. The justices made a value choice to favor
the corrections officials over Francisco Castaneda just as they made a value choice to
favor slave owners or the government when it interned the Japanese-Americans or
businesses when it has struck down so much regulatory legislation. If we see the Court
in this way, then we can begin to hold it accountable for its decisions. Then we can
fully appreciate the powerful case against the Supreme Court for the choices that it has
made throughout history. And then, and only then, can we think about how to reform
6
the Court and make tragic mistakes less likely.

None of the authors question this. Nor do the authors challenge
that the Supreme Court often unquestionably has failed. Rather, as I
read the articles, I see four basic questions arising: First, how can we
4.
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 529 (1996).
5.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (holding that colleges and
universities have a compelling interest in having a diverse student body and that they may use
race as one factor among many in admissions decisions).
6.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 342.
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know whether decisions are good or bad, and relatedly, is this just all
really a liberal's critique of the Supreme Court? Second, is it realistic
to expect the Court to have done any better? Third, in light of my
critique, would the better solution be the elimination or substantial
curtailment of judicial review? Fourth, what are the implications of
my analysis, especially with regard to the issue of abortion rights?
I acknowledge that in identifying these four questions, and
responding to them, I am not accounting for the nuance and much of
the complexity of the arguments presented in the papers by Professors
Devins, Fitzpatrick, Friedman, Lain, Rosenberg, and Rubin. But I
think these are all basic and fair questions to ask about my book and I
will address each in turn.
I. How CAN WE KNOW WHETHER DECISIONS ARE GOOD OR BAD, AND
RELATEDLY, Is THIS JUST ALL REALLY A LIBERAL'S CRITIQUE OF THE
SUPREME COURT?

At the outset of my book, I posit that the Supreme Court exists
preeminently to enforce the Constitution, especially in times of crisis
and particularly to benefit minorities. 7 None of the authors disagrees
that doing so is an important role of the judiciary. But Professor Lain
questions the basis for my premise and writes: "Over the past fifty
years, the protection of minority rights from majoritarian
overreaching has emerged as a primary-perhaps the primaryjustification for judicial review. But where does one get this view of
the Supreme Court's role? What is the basis for that claim?" 8 I could
try and answer this question from an originalist perspective and claim
that the framers were concerned with the protection of minority
rights, even though their minorities were very different from the ones
that I am concerned about today. 9 But I am not an originalist and my
answer is a normative one about the desirability of enforcing the
Constitution and of protecting minorities and the desirability of a
largely non-majoritarian institution-the Supreme Court and the
federal judiciary-doing so. I do not suggest that it is the only way to
define the Supreme Court's role, but it is one that is widely shared, as
10
Professor Lain notes.

7.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 10.
8.
Corrina Barrett Lain, Three Supreme Court "Failures"and a Story of Supreme Court
Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1067 (2016).
9.
Professor Lain makes this point that the Framers were concerned about minority
rights, but different minorities than my focus. Id. at 1068.
10. Id.
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Professor Friedman says that mine is really a critique of the
Court for not being sufficiently liberal.11 He essentially argues that I
am pro-Roe and anti-Heller.12 This possible criticism of the book
troubled me from the very conception of the book. I wrote in the
conclusion:
From the outset in writing this book, I have been concerned that it would be criticized
as a liberal's whining that the Court's decisions have not been liberal enough. My goal
was not to write, 'The Liberal Case Against the Supreme Court,' but to make a case
against the Supreme Court that all across the political spectrum can accept. 13

Indeed, I believe that both liberals and conservatives will agree
with the first part of the book where I point to historical failures of the
Court. As I wrote:
I do not expect that many today, even among staunch conservatives, would defend the
Supreme Court's decisions about slavery in the 19"1 century, its upholding of separate
but equal for 58 years, its allowing restrictions on ineffectual speech during World War
I, its permitting the evacuation and internment of Japanese-Americans in World War
II, or its decisions from the 1890s through 1936 striking down over 200 federal, state,
and local economic regulations. These and other historical examples provide a strong
case against the Supreme Court, even if conservatives may disagree with some of my
more recent examples of what I regard as misguided Supreme Court decisions. 14

But Professor Friedman's criticism is more subtle and more
powerful. He writes that I am trying to have it both ways: I want a
Constitution to constrain society, but also want to having a living and
evolving Constitution. There is a tension, Professor Friedman
contends, between wanting the Constitution to be sufficiently static to
constrain, but also to be sufficiently flexible to evolve. He writes that I
am on the one hand looking
for 'social change' and (on the other) insisting that constitutionalism is like Ulysses
tying himself to the mast. He can't have it both ways, really.... Either you are holding
fast, fulfilling one of Chemerinsky's assigned purposes for judicial review, or you are
modifying the original intent to help Chemerinsky's downtrodden, fulfilling the other. 15

This is a powerful point in expressing the tension of what
society should expect from a Constitution. There is the desire for the
constraint that comes from being governed by a document that is
intentionally very difficult to change, but there also is the need for it

11. Barry Friedman, Letter to Supreme Court (Erwin Chemerinsky is Mad. Why You
Should Care), 69 VAND. L. REV. 995, 996-98.
12. Id. at 4.
13.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 333.

14.
15.

Id. at 334.
Friedman, supra note 11, at 999.
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to be able to deal with contemporary issues and needs. Judicial review
is my answer to this tension. We expect the Court to simultaneously
enforce the limits of the Constitution and to interpret them to deal
with current social issues and needs. There is a need to mediate this
desire for constraint and flexibility that is inherent to the
Constitution. Judicial review is the mechanism for accomplishing this.
Brown v. Board of Education16 and Obergefell v. Hodges 17 are
the epitome of the Court fulfilling this function. Neither can be
justified from an originalist perspective. Both are openly nonoriginalist. In Brown, the Court declared:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We
must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place
in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the

laws. 18

In Obergefell, the Court explained:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The
generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy
liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution's central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must
be addressed. 19

In cases like Brown and Obergefell, the Court is enforcing the
limits of the Constitution, but also applying them to situations that
could not have been anticipated when the Constitution was written in
1787 or the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868. Judicial
review both enforces the limits of the Constitution and allows for the
Constitution to evolve via interpretation.
My book focuses on the many instances in which the Court has
failed in this regard. Professor Lain suggests that my examples, and
even my criticism, show that the Court actually has succeeded. She
writes: 'With the Court as creator of the very expectations by which it
is judged a failure, the fact of Chemerinsky's disappointment in the
Supreme Court is itself a testament to the larger, and largely untold,
story of Supreme Court success. ' 20 She says that it is the Court that
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
347 U.S. at 492-93.
135 S. Ct. at 2598.
Lain, supra note 8, at 1024.
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has created the expectation that it can do better in protecting
minorities and enforcing the Constitution, and that shows the Court
has been successful.
It is an elegant argument to say that the Court succeeds even
when it fails, but I disagree with the premise of Professor Lain's claim.
I believe that the expectation of the Court enforcing the Constitution
and protecting those who are vulnerable comes not from the Court,
but from the Constitution. It is the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition of slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment's assurance of
equal protection, and the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition of race
discrimination in voting that create the expectation that the
Constitution and the Court will protect racial minorities. It is the
First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech that creates the
expectation that even in times of crisis there will be freedom of
expression. It is the Constitution that assures people that it will be a
government under law, even in times of crisis. The expectations are
not, as Professor Lain asserts, a result of the Court, but from the
Constitution itself.
Professor Fitzpatrick offers a different critique of my book: he
says that reasoning from "bad cases" is an undesirable way of
assessing the Court.21 He writes:
The problem with bad-cases reasoning is that it is hopelessly circular. How can we
know whether a case was rightly or wrongly decided unless we have a theory of the
Constitution against which to judge the case to begin with? In other words, to say that
a case was wrongly decided is to assume we already know the right way to interpret
the Constitution. 22

I disagree with Professor Fitzpatrick on many levels. First, I
think it is possible to say that cases like Dred Scott v. Sanford, Plessy
v. Ferguson, and Korematsu v. United States were wrong without
having a theory of the "right" way to interpret the Constitution.
There is a widespread consensus that these decisions were wrong in
their understanding of equal protection and tragic in terms of their
impact on society. I assume that Professor Fitzpatrick agrees that
these were terrible decisions. He thus would agree with my central
conclusion-which is not circular at all-that the Court often has
made crucial errors through American history.
Second, of course, Professor Fitzpatrick is correct that there
need to be criteria for evaluating decisions in order to praise or
criticize the rulings. I set these out in the initial chapter of the book
21. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, A Tribute to Justice Scalia: Why Bad Cases Make Bad
Methodology, 69 VAND. L. REV. 991, 992 (2016).
22. Id. at 991-92.
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when I argue that the preeminent role of the Court should be to
enforce the Constitution, especially to protect minorities and
particularly in times of crisis. Ultimately, constitutional law is about
value choices and appraising the Court's rulings is about considering
whether they made desirable choices. There is nothing circular about
that.
Third, ironically, it is Professor Fitzpatrick who is circular in
his reasoning: he assumes that there is (or even can be) a meaningful
theory of constitutional interpretation and then criticizes those who do
not have one. But this is my strongest disagreement with Professor
Fitzpatrick: I do not believe a useful theory of constitutional
interpretation can exist. It is beyond the scope of this essay to explain
why originalism fails as a method for interpreting the Constitution.
Suffice it to say that never has the Court adopted such a limited way
of interpreting the Constitution and instead always has looked to a
myriad of factors: the Constitution's text and structure, Framers'
intent, tradition, precedent, current social needs, and others. No
theory can prescribe how these are to be considered.
More importantly, ultimately, the question in constitutional
cases is whether there is a compelling, important, or a legitimate
government interest. No theory has yet been advanced, by Justice
Scalia, or anyone else for how to determine this. What is "compelling,"
"important," or 'legitimate" is a value choice, and that choice must be
appraised as such. It is fair to criticize my book for not adequately
defending the value choices that underlie my belief that decisions are
a failure, but I disagree that there is a theory that can be used to
make or appraise these value choices.
II. IS IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE COURT TO HAVE DONE ANY BETTER?
A consistent theme in several of the articles is that my critique
of the Court is unfair because it is not realistic to expect that the
justices could have done any better. They are a product of their culture
and times. This, for example, is the focus of Professor Lain's paper.
She argues that lamentable cases in lamentable times do not support
an indictment against the Supreme Court; if these cases teach us
anything, it is not that the Supreme Court has failed us; it is that the
Court's capacity to protect is constrained by the cultural constraints in
which it operates. 23 Barry Friedman, who also is a part of this
symposium, has written powerfully about the influence of public

23.

Lain, supra note 8,at 1023-24.
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opinion on the Supreme Court's decisions. 24 Professor Rosenberg says
that "[w]e as a society get the kind of Supreme Court we want. The
problem is less with the Court and more with the political preferences
of our fellow citizens. When those change so will Supreme Court
decisions." 25 Professor Rubin's paper is about understanding the
Court's decisions in context.
Of course, it is indisputable that Supreme Court justices live in
society and are affected by the events and attitudes around them.
Professor Lain does a masterful job of showing that some of the worst
Supreme Court decisions-Plessy v. Ferguson,26 Buck v. Bell, 27 and
Korematstu v. United States2 8-must
be understood in their
29
context.
sociopolitical
Professor Lain, of course, is correct. But I think she conflates
two distinct questions: First, should we regard these decisions as
undesirable rulings? And if so, second, should we have expected the
Court to do better? As to the former question, there is no disagreement
between Professor Lain and me, or among any of the authors, that
Plessy v. Ferguson, Buck v. Bell, and Korematsu v. United States were
tragically bad decisions. Professor Lain says: "In short, the point is not
that Plessy, Buck, and Korematsu aren't lamentable-they are. The
point is that these lamentable cases were decided in lamentable
times." 30 That is sufficient, to use Professor Lain's term, for an
"indictment" against the Supreme Court. It failed terribly and at
particularly crucial moments in American history and with great
consequences: decades of segregation, 60,000 Americans involuntarily
surgically sterilized, and the evacuation and internment of 110,000
Japanese-Americans.
Professor Rubin says that the "anguish and uncertainty that
we presently experience when confronting such issues should caution
us against quick condemnation of the Buck v. Bell Court on the basis
of hindsight." 31 But I believe that is exactly what we should do for
Buck v. Bell and for all decisions-look back and assess whether we

24.

BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009).

25. Gerald Rosenberg, The Broken-Hearted Lover: Erwin Chemerinsky's Romantic
Longings for a Mythical Court, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1075, 1077.
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27.
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
28. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
29. Lain, supra note 8, at 1023 ("[I]t is truly striking how strong the sociopolitical context
in all three of these cases was.").
30. Id.
31. Edward L. Rubin, The Supreme Court in Context: Conceptual, Pragmatic, and
Institutional, 69 VAND.L. REV. 1115, 1126.
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believe the Court did what we believe was the right result in
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution. We can argue over what
would have been the "right result," but I expect little disagreement
over this in discussing Buck v. Bell.
The second question, whether the Court should have been
expected to do better, is far less important to my project. My goal was
to show that the Court has failed and my hope is that recognizing
these as failures might be beneficial. Perhaps doing so will make such
tragic errors less likely to occur in the future. But still Professor Lain's
question is fair: are justices so much a product of their time that it is
not realistic to expect them to do any better?
Here Professor Lain and I disagree. She says that in Plessy,
Buck, and Korematsu the Court's decisions were part of a sociopolitical context and therefore it was not realistic for the Court to do
better. But for me, the "therefore" does not follow. Professor Lain is
correct in describing the intense social pressures of the times and in
acknowledging how justices are products of their times. But that is an
explanation, not an excuse. I think in each of these instances, the
Court abandoned the underlying values of the Constitution. To pick an
example discussed by Professor Lain, Korematsu was a six-to-three
decision, including powerful dissents by Justices Robert Jackson and
Frank Murphy. They articulated a simple, but basic constitutional
principle: incarcerating people solely on the basis of race is inherently
and inescapably a denial of equal protection. Even amidst the social
and political pressures of the time, it is a principle that the majority of
the justices should have followed and should have been expected to
follow. As I explain in my book, "It is too easy to make excuses for the
justices and say that it is unrealistic to have expected them to do
32
better."
Professor Rubin provides a strong basis for responding to
Professor Lain, and frankly in ways that I had never considered.
Professor Rubin argues that one can
contextualize these decisions in three different ways. The first, which can be described
as a conceptual contextualization, is to place the decision in the mental framework that
prevailed at the time the decision was made ... The second form of contextualization is
pragmatic... The third form of contextualization can be described as institutional. 33

Professor Rubin's analysis provides a strong response to Professor
Lain's explanation of Buck v. Bell:

32.
33.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 89.
Rubin, supra note 29, at 1117-18.
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Thus, while we cannot charge the Buck v. Bell Court with our present view that the
sterilization was based on pseudoscience, we can charge it with a failure to be attuned
to the controversies that existed at the time. The offhand dismissal of opposing views
that is implicit in Justice Holmes's infamous phrase reflects a mental slovenliness that
can be condemned without anachronism. 3

I find Professor Rubin's analysis of how to appraise Supreme
Court decisions in their context elegant and persuasive. But I wonder
in reading his paper and Professor Lain's, once it is agreed that the
Court was wrong, why does it matter whether it is realistic to have
expected the Court to have done better? My claim is not one of moral
blameworthiness, but rather that the Court failed. The hope is that if
it is recognized that the Court made egregious errors and if it is
understood as to why (and Professor Lain offers that explanation), it
will help to decrease the likelihood of such mistakes in the future.

III. IN LIGHT OF MY CRITIQUE, WOULD THE BETTER SOLUTION BE THE
ELIMINATION, OR SUBSTANTIAL RESTRICTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?

Professor Rosenberg emphatically rejects the possibility that
the Court can be expected to do better. He writes that "[t]he
underlying problem is structural. It will only be solved if the role of
the Court is reduced. ' 35 Professor Rosenberg persuasively identifies
the structural constraints that inherently limit what the Court can do,
including the selection process, 36 the limits of judicial independence, 3 7
and the political context of decisions. 38 Professor Rosenberg thus
explains the constraints on the Court that explain the decisions I
discuss. He rightly questions how much the proposals that I advance
39
will make a difference in the Court's decision-making.
My disagreement with Professor Rosenberg is over his
conclusion about the Court and his recommendation about what to
about it. Professor Rosenberg argues that "[h]istorically, the practice
of judicial review has done more harm than good to those lacking
power and privilege. ' 40 He says, "what they cannot do is to protect the
vulnerable when the broader society is unwilling to do so."41 Professor

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1118 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927)).
Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 1113.
Id. at 1083-85.
Id. at 1085-87.
Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1104-11.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
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Rosenberg argues as an alternative that a solution would be
"continuing with the Court's power of judicial review while vesting
appellate power over decisions invalidating state and federal laws in
42
Congress."
Is Professor Rosenberg right that the Court has done "more
harm than good to those lacking power and privilege?" I thought about
this question a great deal in writing the book and concluded that there
is simply no way to know whether on balance the Court has been
beneficial or harmful for society. Assuming that my criteria for
evaluating the Court are accepted, how would it be possible to add up
all of the positive and all of the negative effects of the decisions that
have benefited those lacking power and privilege? How could anyone
43
begin to measure the negative effects of say Dred Scott v. Sandford,
or the positive ones of say Brown v. Board of Education,44 let alone of
all of the other rulings, and then weigh them in a meaningful way?
For this reason, I very carefully avoided making an overall judgment
about whether the Court has been overall a positive or negative force,
limiting myself to the conclusion that the Court often has failed, often
at the most important times and at the most important tasks.
Nor do I accept that the Court can't "protect the vulnerable
when the broader society is unwilling to do so." There are certainly
examples to the contrary, such as Supreme Court decisions in favor of
criminal defendants and prisoners. To pick a recent example, in
Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling that California
had to reduce its prison population to ensure adequate protection of
medical and mental health care to its inmates. 45 The Court did this
over the vehement objections of the State of California. By any
measure, prisoners are among the most vulnerable in society. When is
the last time that a legislature on its own provided more rights for
prisoners? The courts often have failed prisoners, but the judiciary has
a far better record than the legislature when society is unwilling to do
so. As I explain in the book:
Admittedly, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have an overall less than stellar record
of protecting prisoners' rights, but there is no doubt that judicial review has
dramatically improved prison conditions for countless inmates who would be
abandoned by the political process. When is the last time that a legislature adopted a
law to expand the rights of prisoners or criminal defendants? In competition for scarce
dollars, legislatures have every political incentive to spend as little as possible on

42. Id. at 1112.
43. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that slaves are property and not citizens and
invalidating the Missouri Compromise).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45.
131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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prisoners. Moreover, how much worse might it be if politicians and prison officials
46
knew that the constitutionality of their actions could not be reviewed by the courts?

More generally, I believe that Marbury v. Madison got it right:
the Constitution exists to limit the government and those limits are
meaningless if not enforced. Professor Rosenberg responds to this by
saying that I am "mistaken . . . in apparently believing that
vindication can only come from courts. The most important institution
for the creation and protection of rights in the United States by far is
the Congress. '47 He then presents examples of positive federal
legislation.
We, of course, do not disagree about the desirability of this
legislation or about Congress's role in protecting rights. But we
disagree over my view that it is essential that the courts be available
to enforce the limits of the Constitution. For those whose rights have
been violated, vindication is from the courts or nowhere. Throughout
the book, I give examples of many individuals whose rights were
violated, but who were turned away by the courts. 48 Court remedies,
including damages and injunctions, are necessary to deter and halt
constitutional violations, as well as to compensate injured individuals.
In fact, legislation to protect individuals from violation of their rights
depends on judicial action for enforcement.
Would it be desirable, as Professor Rosenberg argues, to vest
"appellate power over decisions invalidating state and federal laws in
Congress." 49 In fairness to Professor Rosenberg, he only briefly makes
this suggestion and does not defend it. I am very skeptical. Why does
Professor Rosenberg believe that Congress will do a better job than
the Court, especially when it comes to protecting the vulnerable? As
explained above, Professor Rosenberg says that the Court has failed in
large part because of the political context of its decisions. But
Congress operates in that same political context and is even more
likely to be responsive to it because its members have to seek
reelection. Moreover, the judiciary must hear everyone's complaint;
Congress rarely responds to those without the means of influence.
The judiciary sees its role as interpreting and enforcing the
Constitution; Congress does not.

46.
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CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 276-77.
Rosenberg, supra note 23, at 1102.
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My book criticizes the Court's performance through American
history, but I don't see any reason for believing that Congress would
be better at enforcing the Constitution or protecting minorities. It is
for this reason that I oppose elimination of judicial review or its
substantial curtailment as Professor Rosenberg advocates. Allowing
Congress to overturn Supreme Court decisions seems worse in terms
of protecting the vulnerable. Over the course of my career, I have
represented a homeless man in the Supreme Court, 50 Guantanamo
detainees,5 1 death penalty defendants, 52 challengers to an Arizona law
eliminating Mexican-American studies, 53 victims of police abuse, 54 and
many other politically unpopular individuals. I often have lost. But I
know for my clients it is the courts or nothing. Ultimately, that is why
I prefer to look for ways to improve the Court and make it more likely
to succeed, rather than to eliminate or substantially curtail judicial
review.
IV. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S SHORTCOMINGS,
ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF ABORTION RIGHTS?

Professor Devins approaches my book in a very different way.
He notes that my book is largely silent on abortion.55 He is correct and
other reviewers criticized the book for this. 56 This was a deliberate
choice. In my prior book, The ConservativeAssault on the Constitution,
I explicitly defended the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 57 I did not
think I had anything new to say. Also, believing that Roe was rightly
decided, it was not a logical focus for a book that was primarily about
instances where I think that the Court got it wrong.
The thesis of Professor Devins's article is that "now is the time
for the Court to decisively intervene in the abortion controversy by
issuing a maximalist Roe-like decision; today's politics do not support
50. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 647 (2005) (denying a challenge to a Ten Commandments
monument at the Texas state capitol).
51. Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (2002) (dismissing suit on behalf of
Guantanamo detainees for lack of standing).
52. Wilkinson v. Polk, 227 F. App'x. 210 (4th Cir. 2007).
53. Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2015).
54. See, e.g., Berry v. Gates, 956 U.S. 274 (9th Cir. 1992).
55. Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism: Abortion Politics, Party Polarization,
and the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to Elected Government, 69 VAND. L. REV.
935, 940-41.
56. See Terry Eastland, Book Review: The Case Against the Supreme Court by Erwin
Chemerinsky, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/book-review-the-caseagainst-the-supreme-court-by-erwin-chemerinsky- 1411598692 [https://perma.cc/57ME-4N5Q].
57. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 173-74
(2010).
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an intermediate standard like Casey's undue burden test."58 Professor
Devins argues that the rise of the Tea Party and party polarization
59
call into question the benefits of an intermediate standard.
I agree with Professor Devins's conclusion, but not his premise.
The Court should aggressively protect abortion rights from erosion or
elimination via the political process. But unlike Professor Devins, I do
not base this conclusion on the current political times. For me, the
right to abortion is a fundamental aspect of reproductive autonomy
properly found to be protected as an aspect of liberty under the due
process clause. From this perspective, Roe v. Wade got it exactly right
in finding a right to abortion for all women in the country.
The Court in Roe faced three questions. First, is there a right to
privacy protected by the Constitution even though it is not mentioned
in the document's text? Second, if so, is the right infringed by a
prohibition of abortion? Third, if so, does the state have a sufficient
justification for upholding laws prohibiting abortion?
As for the first question, the Court long had protected
unenumerated rights under the Constitution, including reproductive
autonomy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court stated: "If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
60
to bear or beget a child."
As for the second question, obviously, forbidding abortions
interferes with a woman's ability to control her reproductive autonomy
and to decide for herself, in the words of Eisenstadt v. Baird, whether
to "bear or beget a child." Also, no one can deny that forcing a woman
to continue a pregnancy against her will is an enormous intrusion on
her control over her body. Justice Blackmun expressed this forcefully
in his majority opinion in Roe:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a
child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved. 61
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The third question is whether the state has a compelling
interest in protecting fetal life. Here, too, I believe that Roe v. Wade
got it right. There is no way to resolve the question of whether the
fetus is a human person. This is a question that is best left to each
woman to decide for herself. Some will believe that human personhood
begins at conception and never would have an abortion; millions of
other women do not see it that way. In light of the autonomy interest
involved, it is a choice for the woman to make and not the legislature.
This brief defense of Roe just sketches out my argument. My
point is that I believe that Roe was correct when decided and is correct
today. Fundamental rights should not be left to the political process,
whatever its nature. So I agree with Professor Devins's conclusion of
the need for "maximalist" protection of abortion rights, but because of
the nature of the right and not based on the political process at this
point in time.
CONCLUSION

No words can express my joy in reading such thoughtful
articles about my book. The authors have caused me to think carefully
about my arguments and to wish in many instances that I had
explained things differently or had taken into account the points they
have made.
Several of the authors describe my "heroic" vision of the
Supreme Court. Professor Friedman writes that I am an "Acolyte" of
the Court. I will agree to these characterizations. I have devoted my
professional career to teaching, writing, and litigating constitutional
law. It is based on a faith in the Constitution and the institutions that
it creates, including the Supreme Court. I believe that the Court can
and should be expected to play a heroic role in society in enforcing the
Constitution, especially in times of crisis and particularly for
minorities.
I continue to have that faith. I wrote The Case Against the
Supreme Court because the Court has too often failed. My response is
not to give up my faith in the Constitution and the Court, but instead
to look to make the Court better. The first step in that regard is to
recognize where it went wrong and to begin thinking about how to
change it. That was my purpose in writing the book.

